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The rise of warfare within a polarizing Congress certainly suggests a link between the two. Indeed, polarization may be necessary for warfare, but it is not a sufficient cause of it.
Parties that are divided over policy can have a serious and honest debate, which can even become heated. In the first half of the famous idiom, the opposing sides can "agree to disagree." Quite apart from the serious policy disagreement, though, the debate between the opposing sides can degenerate into a shouting match where the policy proscriptions are lost in a fight over legislative games where the combatants question the motives, integrity, and patriotism of their opponents. Under such a situation, the second half of the idiom -"without being disagreeable" -is never realized.
This partisan warfare dimension is harder to quantify, though it most certainly exists.
What I call, "partisan warfare," is what Barbara Sinclair (2006, 364) called "ugly politics" in a book titled, Party Wars. She defined ugly politics as "politics descending to personal attacks that are inflammatory and untrue." Frances Lee (2009), loosened up this definition in recasting it as "beyond ideology" in her book of the same name. Lee argues that only so much of the divide between the parties can be understood as a difference in ideology. The rest of the divide -by some accounts, the lion's share of the divide -is motivated by some other goal. Lee (2009, 193) defines this behavior as "partisan bickering" and offers the following description:
If partisanship has roots in members' political interests, then political parties actually exacerbate and institutionalize conflict, rather than merely represent and give voice to preexisting policy disagreements in the broader political environment.
In their quest to win elections and wield power, partisans impeach one another's motives, question one another's ethics and competence, engage in reflexive partisanship, and-when it is politically useful to do so-exploit and deepen divisions rather than seeking common ground. I argue that it is this portion of the divide that causes the angst of those participants and observers of today's Congress. Lee restricts her evaluation of the combat that is beyond ideology to an examination of roll-call votes, which is an appropriate first step. Partisan warfare, though, can operate in contexts beyond the "yeas" and "nays" on the floor. In fact, it is frequently other actions in the legislative and electoral processes that are better exhibits of partisan warfare.
More often than not, congressional scholars have opted to merge these two dimensions for a couple of reasons. First, there is no doubt that they are related. The distinction between party polarization and partisan warfare can easily be masked as the same or at least similar enough to collapse on to one dimension. Second, the second dimension of partisan warfare, especially in comparison to the first, is much harder to isolate, operationalize, and analyze.
Nonetheless, real analytic leverage can be brought to our understanding of how the current Senate operates and how it is evaluated if these dimensions are pulled apart.
In this article, I tease out these two dimensions through an examination of the U.S.
Senate. First, I argue that the Senate, because of its loose rules, provides for fertile ground to explore this second dimension. I also briefly outline the first dimension -party polarization in the Senate. In the second section, I present three anecdotes that clearly show behavior consistent with partisan warfare. In the third section, I undertake a more systematic examination of partisan warfare by examining senators' amendments that result in roll-call votes. I find that the number of roll-call votes on senators' amendments provides material for assessing partisan warfare, but that the measure needs to be refined to capture more fully this second dimension. Before concluding, I put both dimensions back together to assess the utility of separating partisan warfare from party polarization. 
A. The Fertile Ground of the Senate
When senators removed the motion to order the previous question from their rules in 1806, they began down a path that required senators to be more collegial if they hoped to pass bills. The 60-vote cloture requirement and the ability of any one single senator to virtually bring the entire institution to a halt nurtures senators to treat their institution more gingerly than representatives do the House, where the minority party has little recourse. Indeed, the one big difference between Asher's (1973) norms of the House and Matthews's (1960) folkways in the Senate is that the latter includes "loyalty to the institution"; there is no such House norm.
For these reasons, the Senate presents more fertile ground for examining the distinction between party polarizers and partisan warriors. Before turning to measures of the To protect the people from a corrupt system where members could create plush government jobs for themselves, the U.S. Constitution explicitly prohibits lawmakers from serving in an executive branch position for which they voted either to create or to increase the salary thereof. This restriction, called the Emolument Clause, has befuddled presidents and their potential appointees for years by erecting barriers for members to serve in the president's cabinet after they have voted to raise the cabinet secretaries' pay. The current workaround strategy was first used in 1973 when President Nixon wanted Senator William Saxbe (ROhio), who had earlier supported a pay increase for cabinet officials, to be his Attorney
General. Nixon asked Congress to pass a law reducing the attorney general's salary to the level it was before the raise that Saxbe supported. The reduced salary would last until the Senate term for which Saxbe was elected ended at which point Congress would pass another law increasing the attorney general's salary to that of all the other cabinet officials. This workaround had passed muster by both the courts and Congress ever since. Reid, who was blind-sided by the move, criticized Vitter's move: "It is wrong for Sen. Vitter to try to get something in return for moving forward on a matter that the Senate has considered routine for more than a century." 10 He vowed to keep fighting for Salazar's raise.
In a letter to Reid and McConnell the following day, Salazar asked them to "set aside any effort to address" the inequality in his pay. He feared that he needed to take the issue off the It has become common for senators to put holds on bills to force a presidential administration to take a particular action. It is not even that unusual for a hold to be placed on a bill that had cleared both the minority and majority leader. It is precisely because bills like this get held up that the leaders circulate their unanimous consent agreements before they offer them on the Senate floor. What is extraordinary about Vitter's actions is the lack of senatorial courtesy with which they were carried out. The actions are even more out of step because they, in effect, punished a former senator, who was well respected on both sides of the aisle as witnessed by his unanimous confirmation vote. Again, ideology does not seem to be the primary factor motivating Vitter's hold.
C. No Reindeer Games for the Gingrich Senators
The 112 th Congress was difficult for most senators. Democrats were frustrated that the Republicans made legislating exceedingly difficult. The Republicans were frustrated that the Democrats would not consider important legislation passed by the House. Furthermore, they were frustrated that Obama was still in the White House and the Democrats were still a majority in the Senate.
Shortly after Thanksgiving in 2011, Senator Al Franken (D-Minnesota), who is
Jewish, decided that the Senate needed to institute a new tradition to ease tensions. In conspiring with Senator Mike Johanns (R-Nebraska), he sent an email around to his colleagues asking them to participate in a Senate version of Secret Santa. As Franken explained: "I remember one year [as a child] I picked this kid who used to intimidate me on the playground. Turns out after we got to know each other and we became friends. So, I
thought Secret Santa would be a good way to cut through the partisan divide here in the %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% accessed on April 22). Senate. And who knows, maybe it will create some unlikely friendships." 14 Franken and
Johanns set the limit at $10 and picked December 13 as the date that they would exchange gifts.
The trick for the Secret Santa to work, though, was for the senators to participate.
They did. At least 58 -and, perhaps, as many as 61 -senators offered their names up for the possibility of increasing comity (and, perhaps, comedy) 
III. A More Systematic Look at Partisan Warfare
The anecdotes from the previous section help motivate the existence of a second dimension. I try to measure that dimension more systematically in this section by examining the number of roll-call votes on senators' amendments. Admittedly, this metric cannot possible encapsulate the entirety of the second dimension of partisan warfare in the way that roll-call votes can capture the first dimension of party polarization. Nonetheless, the metric can begin to scope out the distinction between party polarization and partisan warfare -of if you like "ugly politics" or the stuff that is "beyond ideology."
Senators may have a variety of reasons for offering an amendment on the Senate floor.
The most obvious reason is that they hope to move the bill closer to their preferred policy.
Indeed, I suspect a good number of amendments on the Senate floor have exactly that purpose at heart. The debate on the Affordability Care Act (aka, "Obamacare") presents other reasons why senators may offer amendments. On March 24, 2010, Senator Coburn (R-Oklahoma) introduced an amendment that prohibited sex offenders from using the health insurance that was being established in Obama's health care reform package to pay for Viagra. Especially given that existing law explicitly forbade it, what senator would possibly vote against such an amendment? As it turned out, 55 out of 57 Democrats did. 20 During this particular debate, the Democrats were orchestrating a complex legislative maneuver that could lead to the passage of health care reform without explicitly overcoming a Republican-led filibuster. By passing the measure through the reconciliation process, the Democrats only needed a majority, but they could not change a word in the bill or the entire process might unravel. As such, the Republicans had the Democrats in the difficult position of voting down amendments that might otherwise seem constructive or reasonable.
In addition to voting down the prohibition of paying for sex offenders' Viagra, the Democrats defeated an amendment by Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) that would ensure that no individual making less than $200,000 would be subject to a tax increase as a consequence of the legislation. They also defeated an amendment by John Ensign (R-Nevada) to protect the damages in medical malpractice suits resulting from pro bono cases. By voting against each of these amendments, Democrats could be subject to campaign commercials arguing that they voted to give Viagra to sex offenders, to raise taxes on those making less than $200,000, and to subject pro bono health care provides to exorbitant malpractice lawsuits. No Democrat Insert Table 1 .
A few names on the list are a bit surprising. Byron Dorgan (D-South Dakota) and
Dale Bumpers (D-Arkansas) were never considered to be Senate malcontents. Furthermore, we could imagine party leaders being partisan warriors, but it is a bit suspicious that George
Mitchell (D-Maine) and Bob Dole (R-Kansas) make the list not when they served as minority leaders, but when they were majority leaders.
Amendment Roll-Call Votes in the Majority and Minority
If the number of amendment roll-call votes is a valid indicator for partisan warriors, the minority party senators should be responsible for more votes than the majority party senators. Over the 10 congresses, the minority party senators are responsible for two-thirds more amendment roll-call votes than the majority party senators (see table 2 ). Of the 10 congresses, the pattern reaches conventional levels of statistical significance 8 times. It fails most miserably in the 107 th Congress (2001-2) , when the Republican majority becomes a minority only after Jim Jeffords (I-Vermont) resigns from the Republican Party six months into the Bush administration.
Insert Table 2 . A more systematic test of this hypothesis can be performed through fixed effects regression model that controls for both the senator and the congress (see appendix for full regression output). Such a test reveals that minority party status increases the number of rollcall votes on senators' amendments by two. Considering that the constant is only 1.4, this effect is fairly large. Furthermore, the within R 2 of 0.13 suggests that a not insignificant amount of the variation within an individual senators amending activity can be explained by their status in the minority party. The number of roll-call votes that come from senators' amendments passes the first two tests. The third test examines the differences in amending activity based on ideological extremism. If this third hypothesis is true, the two dimensions of party polarization and partisan warfare are correlated. In fact, the truer the relationship between ideology and amending activity, the less distinct the two dimensions become. At the extreme, if the amending activity is perfectly correlated with ideology, than the two dimensions collapse on to the one dimension that has received the bulk of the political science analysis.
Amending Activity of Ideologically Extreme Senators
Ideology, especially as mediated by the minority party status, has a marked effect on the senators' amending activity. For a Democrats going from a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.00 (moderate) to -1.00 (liberal), the predicted number of amendment roll-call votes increases by 3 in the majority, but by 22 in the minority (see figure 3 , panel A). The differences for Republicans is not quite as dramatic are even more dramatic (see figure 3, panel B). Changing a moderate into an extreme liberal increases their amendments by 3 in the majority to 22 in the minority.
Insert Figure 3 .
Nonetheless, the relationship is not perfect. The overall R 2 for the model is 0.23, which suggests that a good chunk of the amending activity is neither minority party status nor ideology. With the passing of three tests by the amendment roll-call votes, in this section, I
IV. A Second
present the two dimensions of party polarization and partisan warfare. The results from the tests as well as the argument itself suggests that partisan warfare will be easier to measure in the minority party. To see if warfare, like polarization, is an asymmetric phenomenon between the parties, I examine a recent congress for each party when they toiled in the minority. The two-dimensional depiction of party polarization and partisan warfare is presented in figure 4 . The axes are at the party averages for the respective parties. As such, the quadrants can roughly be thought of as a two-by-two table with data points populated within the "cells" of the table.
Insert Republicans were neither polarizers nor warriors.
This analysis of roll-call votes on amendments suggests a few results. First, these rollcall votes seem to be a good proxy for partisan warfare. The fact that Tom Coburn, the writer of the Viagra amendment, had 15 more amendment roll-call votes than the second person on the list in the last 20 years in the Senate speaks to its power. The list of high amendment rollcall vote senators suggests that it is not just the paramount of the list that receives face validity. Furthermore, the data analysis suggests that it is exactly the senators who we would expect to be partisan warriors that are partisan warriors at least as defined by which senators' amendments result in roll-call votes. Minority party members who are particularly ideologically extreme are most likely to sponsor amendments that receive roll-call votes.
Second, while party polarization seems to be fully engaged by the senators in both parties, the death-by-amendment strategy seems to be carried out explicitly by relatively few senators. In the 109 th Congress, the five most liberal Democrats were responsible for 15 percent of the total Democratic party polarization. In contrast, the five Democrats whose amendments resulted in the most roll-call votes, accounted for 31 percent of the Democratic total. The distinction between generals and foot soldiers was even bigger within the Five Star General, Coburn, alone had 17 percent of the total, though he represented just 2.5 percent of the Republican Conference. While party polarizers seem to abound in both parties, partisan warfare appears to be carried out by relatively few minority party members.
Third, though, this measure is not perfect for capturing this second dimension. The strong correlation between roll-call votes on amendments and ideology suggests, in fact, that the two dimensions might not be that distinct. This analysis suggests that the measure needs
to undergo further refinement in order to capture more vividly partisan warfare. In future research, I will examine the underlying voting behavior on these amendments. The moderates who are sponsoring more amendments, and thus being called "partisan warriors" maybe doing so for nefarious purposes, but also virtuous ones. If the underlying votes on their amendments are bipartisan, then it would be wrong to characterize their behavior as warfare rather than the normal legislative behavior practiced by actively engaged senators. If their amendments, however, do not receive support from the majority party, we will have more evidence for their partisan warfare behavior. While partisan warfare is a difficult concept to quantify, the quotes from Bayh and Snowe suggest something more than polarization is ruining their beloved Senate and while more than ideology is motivating Coburn's Viagra amendment, no easily quantifiable metric can be gathered to measure warfare. In this paper, I argue that the number of roll-call votes caused by senators' amendments is a proxy that can be used systematically to understand partisan warfare in the Senate.
V. Conclusion
Vitter's attempt to "bribe" Secretary Salazar, the rejection of a bipartisan budget commission by one-time supporters, and the lack of across-the-board participation in the Secret Santa suggest that senators sometimes act not out of their ideological preferences, but out of their desire to win -and to win at almost any cost. The more comprehensive data analysis suggests a systematic explanation with partisan warfare at its roots can explain senators' actions in a way above and beyond their ideology. This analysis suggests that senator amendment activity maybe used as the basis of getting at partisan warfare, but not without some refinement, which I hope to conduct in future research. 89th% 90th% 91st% 92nd% 93rd% 94th% 95th% 96th% 97th% 98th% 99th% 100th%101st% 102nd% 103rd%104th%105th%106th%107th%108th%109th%110th%111th%112th% 
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